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COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT ENFORCEMENT:
CRUEL, UNUSUAL, AND DUE FOR REFORM
Tiffany Curtiss
Abstract: This Comment argues that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) uses an
outdated concept of technology in everyday activities that can lead to unexpected and grossly
disproportional federal criminal charges. The CFAA’s vague definitions passively provide
broad prosecutorial discretion that may turn millions of everyday internet users into
criminals, even in cases of a common breach of an online terms-of-service agreement.
Congress should look to the Eighth Amendment and draw from its principles in reforming
the CFAA. The Comment concludes with a proposed interpretation of the CFAA that would
better align the statute with other criminal laws, namely trespass. Courts should require the
owners of protected computers to give notice to a user before that user can be found to
violate the CFAA based on unauthorized access.

INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in
1986 at a time when computer crime concerns largely focused on threats
to government computers and critical infrastructure networks. 1 In the
1980s, most homes did not have a computer, and computer crimes
generally required a user with sophisticated skills. 2 Fast-forward thirty
years and this is no longer the case. Technology has made its way into
the hands and homes of everyday consumers. Given the CFAA’s vague
definitions, nearly anyone with access to the internet could easily and
unknowingly commit a felony.
This Comment argues that courts should look to Eighth Amendment
principles when interpreting the CFAA and its definitions. 3 Such
principles suggest courts should compare the seriousness of the offense
and severity of the sentencing with sentences of similar severity and
sentences for the same criminal act. 4 Unless and until Congress amends
the CFAA to clarify its boundaries, courts should interpret unauthorized
access similar to trespass in order to more clearly distinguish between

1. See Joseph M. Olivenbaum, <Ctrl> <Alt> <Delete>: Rethinking Federal Computer Crime
Legislation, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 574, 586 (1997).
2. Id. at 580.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra section II.B.
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encouraged, condoned, and forbidden online activities, especially when
put in the context of today’s technological proliferation.
Congress has broadened the range of devices protected under the
CFAA to now include private servers. 5 Congress designed the CFAA to
protect critical government infrastructure from outsider hacking, but the
CFAA has been used to prosecute violations of a private website’s terms
of service 6 and is frequently used in tandem with trade secret
misappropriation claims against departing employees. 7 Despite harsh
criticism and calls for reform, proponents of the CFAA argue that the
statute needs to be broad and flexible for national security purposes.8
This desire to catch bad actors results in wide-ranging prosecutorial
discretion that may or may not shield everyday internet users from
CFAA liability. 9
The difficult decisions regarding proper enforcement of the CFAA
have fallen to the courts. For example, it is increasingly common for
consumers to access software programs when connecting to service
providers’ servers instead of downloading a copy to their local harddrive. 10 This near-constant access to private servers exponentially
increases the instances of access to protected computers that form the
base of any CFAA violation. 11 Due to vague definitions and evolving
technological norms, the courts are split on how to interpret the CFAA. 12
Part I of this Comment explains the history and intent of the CFAA
and the circuit split resulting from the mismatch between its broad
language and today’s reality. Part II discusses how CFAA reform should
look to evolving standards of decency and Eighth Amendment
5. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 1561, 1563–71 (2010).
6. See Marcia Hofmann & Rainey Reitman, Rebooting Computer Crime Law Part 1: No Prison
Time For Violating Terms of Service, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2013/01/rebooting-computer-crime-law-part-1-no-prison-time-for-violating-terms-ofservice [https://perma.cc/VXH3-P6R5].
7. See, e.g., Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121
(W.D. Wash. 2000).
8. See Garrett D. Urban, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of Current
Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1369, 1388–89 (2011).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Brief of Elec. Frontier Found. of Defendants-Appellants, Facebook, Inc. v. Power
Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Nos. 13-17102, 13-17154), 2014 WL
1004574.
11. Id.
12. See Ajuba Int’l, L.L.C. v. Saharia, 871 F. Supp. 2d 671, 685–86 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(discussing how this split of authority originates from competing interpretations of CFAA terms).
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principles. Part III proposes that Congress reform the CFAA to require
owners to provide notice of revoked access to users before a term of
service violation can be used for a CFAA charge.
I.

THE CFAA IS OUTDATED AND VAGUE

A.

Congress Enacted Computer Crime Laws to Deter Outside
Hacking of Government Computers

Before home computers became prevalent, prosecutors viewed crimes
that involved a computer or network as traditional crimes, such as
internet gambling or cyberstalking. 13 The use of a computer did not
affect the elements of the crime. Computer crimes remained susceptible
to federal prosecution under existing criminal statutes.14 In essence,
crimes committed using computers were not necessarily crimes of
computer misuse. 15 Therefore, prosecuting crimes committed while
using computers did not require new laws.
Yet relying on established criminal laws was not always sufficient. 16
The government had difficulty prosecuting malicious computer conduct
under criminal statutes such as trespass and theft because the elements of
those crimes relied on physical interaction with property. 17 Responding
to computer proliferation across government agencies and the threat of
rogue employees and hackers, Congress created the category “crimes of
computer misuse.” 18 Congress aimed to create new “computer misuse”
crimes specifically to deter and combat those who “intentionally access[]
a protected computer without authorization.” 19
Fear of hackers played a role in driving Congress to address computer
crimes. 20 A frequently noted example is the movie WarGames, in which
a teenage hacker inadvertently compromised a government weapons
13. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1602 (2003).
14. For example, the distribution of child pornography in digital format would fall under the same
criminal statutes had the distribution been in print form despite the involvement of computer or
network.
15. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1603.
16. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 9–10 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689,
3695 (“It is obvious that traditional theft/larceny statutes are not the proper vehicle to control the
spate of computer abuse and computer assisted crimes.”).
17. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1605−06.
18. Id. at 1602.
19. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B) (2012). See also Urban, supra
note 8, at 1388–89.
20. Olivenbaum, supra note 1, at 596–97.
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system and almost started a nuclear war, causing a great deal of
apprehension among congressional leaders. 21 A House Report on
computer crime legislation mentions WarGames, specifically describing
WarGames as a “realistic representation of the automatic dialing and
access capabilities of the personal computer.” 22
1.

Congress Originally Designed the CFAA to Complement Existing
Tort Law

Starting in the mid-1980’s, Congress sought to create computer
crimes law to protect government computers and property by filling the
gap between existing criminal statutes and harms created through the
assistance of computers. 23 Prior to the enactment of computer-specific
criminal laws, prosecutors used mail fraud and wire fraud statutes to
prosecute computer crimes, although the statutes were often
insufficient. 24 One House Report stated that other statutes also provided
insufficient coverage, noting “traditional theft/larceny statutes [we]re not
the proper vehicle to control the spate of computer abuse and computer
assisted crimes.” 25
In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
(CCCA), 26 including the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 27 codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Congress designed
the CCCA to target hackers who accessed computers to disrupt or
destroy computer functionality or to steal information. 28 Congress
viewed such hackers as criminals who had the capacity to “access and
control high technology processes vital to our everyday lives.” 29
The CCCA was the first federal computer crime statute established by
Congress. It created three new federal crimes for knowingly accessing a

21. Id.
22. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3696. See also
Olivenbaum, supra note 1, at 596–97.
23. See COMPUTER CRIME & INTELL. PROP. SECT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CRIM. DIV.,
PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES (2007), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/
ccmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YGE-X6NC] [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL ON PROSECUTING
COMPUTER CRIMES].
24. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 6.
25. Id. at 9.
26. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
27. Id. § 2101.
28. See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2009).
29. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 8.
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computer without authorization or exceeding one’s authorization. 30
Congress intended each offense to address specific government interests:
(1) national security threats; (2) financial records security; and (3)
security of government property. 31
Although the Comprehensive Crime Control Act was notably
robust, 32 Congress nonetheless found the computer crime provisions
lacking. 33 Two years after the CCCA’s enactment, Congress amended
the statute 34 to include three new crimes: computer fraud, 35 hacking
another person, 36 and trafficking passwords. 37 Section 1030 is also
known as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) after the short
title of this 1986 amendment. 38 Congress has amended the CFAA nine
times since its enactment. 39 While originally intended to fill the gap
between existing tort law and malicious computer conduct to make
whole those who suffered harm to intangible property, the broad drafting
of the CFAA definitions has overextended the digital divide bridge
beyond tort law and into contract law.
2.

The Introduction of a Private Cause of Action in the CFAA Led to
an Unintended Expansion of Criminal Liability

As computers became ubiquitous in businesses and homes across the
country, concerns about harm caused to and through computers rose.
Notorious stories of highly destructive hacking led to further expansions
of the CFAA. 40 The scope of the CFAA broadened with each

30. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(1)–(3) (2012).
31. Kerr, supra note 5, at 1564.
32. Id.
33. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2, as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2479 (“[C]oncern about these problems has become more pronounced as
computers proliferate in businesses and homes across the nation and as evidence mounts that
existing criminal laws are insufficient to address the problem of computer crime.”).
34. Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986).
35. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012) (Accessing to Defraud and
Obtain Value).
36. Id. § 1030(a)(5) (Damaging a Computer or Information).
37. Id. § 1030(a)(6) (Trafficking in Passwords).
38. Pub. L. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 § 1 (1986).
39. See Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond WarGames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Should Be Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 405, 414
n.48 (2012).
40. See Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Two
Problems and Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 453.
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amendment, expanding the types of conduct that fell within its reach. 41
For example, in 1996, Congress replaced the term “federal interest
computer” with “protected computer.” 42 After the attacks on the World
Trade Center in 2001, Congress used the USA PATRIOT Act to amend
the 1996 definition of “protected computer” 43 to “make clear that this
term includes computers outside of the United States so long as they
affect ‘interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United
States.’” 44 In 2008, Congress added the phrase “affecting interstate
commerce” to the definition of “protected computer” in an effort to align
the CFAA’s jurisdiction with that of the Commerce Clause. 45
The addition of a private cause of action was a significant change to
the CFAA. 46 A 1994 amendment added a provision that allows a
complainant to bring a private civil cause of action for several of the
violations of the CFAA, allowing anyone harmed by a violation to seek
compensatory and injunctive relief. 47 Section 1030(g) authorizes a
private cause of action for compensatory damages and injunctive and
other equitable relief by any person “who suffers damage or loss by
reason of a violation,” but only if the conduct involves one of the
following factors set forth in subsection 1030(c)(4)(A)(i):
(I) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for
purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding
brought by the United States only, loss resulting from a related
course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected
computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value; 48

41. See Kerr, supra note 5, at 1563–71 (stating that the statute’s history “shows a clear and
uniform trend of expansion”).
42. Id.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2006).
44. DOJ MANUAL ON PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 23, at 5.
45. Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1990, S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 9 (explaining that the
Commerce Clause was an appropriate addition to the CFAA due to “the interstate nature of
computer networks and the ease with which computer abuse . . . can spread across State lines”).
46. While this Comment focuses on proportionality of criminal punishments under the CFAA, it
is important to note that courts can apply civil precedents in the criminal context when the same
standard governs. See, e.g., United States v. Bigham, 812 F.2d 943, 948 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[B]etween
the criminal and civil statutes the courts recognize the intent of Congress to cover the same cases,
though providing different remedies.”).
47. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012) (“Any person who suffers
damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the
violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.”).
48. These losses are limited to economic damages. Id.
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(II) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or
impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment or
care of one or more individuals;
(III) physical injury to any person;
(IV) a threat to public health or safety; [or]
(V) damage affecting a computer system used by or for an entity
of the United States government in furtherance of the
administration of justice, national defense, or national
security . . . . 49
Private companies have used the civil provisions of the CFAA to
recover damages from the misappropriation of confidential information
by disloyal employees and other business-to-business litigation
associated with computer use. 50 In the civil context, some courts have
held that a breach of contract results in unauthorized access. 51
B.

Courts Have Struggled to Apply the CFAA Consistently Between
Civil and Criminal Cases

Legal scholars anticipated that the introduction of a private cause of
action would lead to a broadened interpretation of the CFAA in the
criminal context. 52 Indeed, courts became quickly divided in applying
the CFAA to civil cases, 53 which in turn provided a wide spectrum of
precedents that federal prosecutors could rely on. For example, in United
States v. Drew, 54 prosecutors charged the defendant for accessing a
protected computer without authorization to obtain information in

49. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i).
50. See Brenton, supra note 40, at 430; Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage,
Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
51. See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583–84 (1st Cir. 2001)
(holding that whether the use of a scraper program exceeded authorized access within meaning of
CFAA depended on executive’s breach of his confidentiality agreement with company);
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d as modified, 356
F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that use of an automated search robot violated the plaintiff’s policy
and was therefore unauthorized under the CFAA).
52. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1599 (“Given the usual rule that civil precedents apply to criminal
cases, however, these cases threaten a dramatic and potentially unconstitutional expansion of
criminal liability in cyberspace.”).
53. See Condux Int’l, Inc. v. Haugum, No. 08-4824 ADM/JSM, 2008 WL 5244818, at *4 (D.
Minn. Dec. 15, 2008) (discussing the two competing lines of cases interpreting the “without
authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” in a civil context with one line of cases holding that
unauthorized use of information is sufficient and the other holding that the CFAA requires
unauthorized use of access).
54. 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
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furtherance of a tortious act. 55 The government relied heavily on civil
cases to support its argument that the CFAA’s use of “access” was not
unconstitutionally vague and cited only one criminal case that did not
squarely address the issue. 56
In Drew, the defendant created a MySpace account under a fake name
to bully a young girl. 57 Translated into CFAA terms, the defendant used
a computer to intentionally access a protected computer—the MySpace
servers—used in interstate commerce. 58 Since she was using the account
under a fake name, her use violated the MySpace user agreement, and
therefore her use was unauthorized and in excess of authorized access. 59
Prosecutors characterized her actions to fit the CFAA by arguing that,
via an interstate communication (MySpace messages), Drew committed
tortious acts, namely intentional infliction of emotional distress on the
young girl. 60 The defense argued that “legislative history demonstrates
the Congressional intent to prohibit trespass and theft under § 1030, not
improper motive or use. Cyberbullying is not, under any definition,
trespass or theft.” 61
The defense in Drew also highlighted the issue of prosecutorial
discretion in bringing CFAA charges supported by civil precedents.
“[T]he problem is not a delegation of legislative power, but rather
prosecutorial power. Any website owner can, under the government’s
view in this case, set terms that can cause a violation of federal laws.” 62
The court held that “a CFAA misdemeanor violation as per 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1030(a)(2)(C) and 1030(c)(2)(A) upon the conscious violation of a
website’s terms of service runs afoul of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine,” 63 defeating the prosecution’s case.
The Ninth Circuit requires civil cases to involve conduct that would
meet the criminal standards of lenity, holding that although the CFAA
permits private parties to bring a cause of action, it is primarily a

55. This was a violation under the CFAA. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(2) (2012).
56. See generally Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
57. Id.
58. Indictment, United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CR08-00582), 2008
WL 2078622.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Consolidated Reply to Government’s Opposition to Motions to Dismiss, United States v.
Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CR-08-0582), 2008 WL 3889184.
62. Id.
63. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 464 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
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“criminal statute.” 64 However, several circuits uphold criminal
convictions if the conduct would have been a violation in the civil
context. The Fifth Circuit in 2010 upheld the criminal convictions in
United States v. John, 65 where a former employee misused customer
account information for a fraudulent scheme, thereby exceeding the
employer’s authorization. 66 The court stated that while his employer
authorized his access to customer account information, the employee’s
use of the information violated the employer’s policies. 67
The next year the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Rodriguez 68
upheld a CFAA conviction of an employee who used information
accessed through the employer’s computer databases. 69 The defendant’s
role with the Social Security Administration gave him access to view
individuals’ personal information. 70 He used this access to gain
information about women he was romantically involved with or
interested in. 71 The court acknowledged that the defendant did not use
the information he obtained to commit any additional crimes, but stated
that the manner in which Rodriguez used the information was not
welcomed by the victims. 72 The court found the conduct in violation of a
company policy that employees agreed to by signing an
acknowledgement form. 73 The court held that a sentence of twelve
months of imprisonment was reasonable. 74

64. See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing that the
rule of lenity should require courts to interpret “without authorization” from a criminal
perspective—where interpretations are not surprisingly and unexpectedly burdensome to defendants
and where ambiguity will cut against the government).
65. 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1237 (2013).
66. Id. at 269.
67. See id. at 271–72 (finding that John exceeded her authorized access because her actions were
both an explicit violation of company policy and part of an illegal scheme, not an intended use of
the computer system).
68. 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 966 (2011).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1260–61.
72. Id. at 1265.
73. See id. at 1260 (involving a Social Security Administration employee who accessed private
information about several women for personal reasons).
74. Id. at 1265.
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CFAA Definitions Are Difficult to Apply Given Today’s Computer
Norms

The CFAA’s definitions are difficult for courts to apply because
software and services are often distributed through a constant connection
to protected servers. An end user agreement granting access to a server
governs nearly every webpage. 75 This access provides a starting point
for many of the ambiguous and divided CFAA opinions. The threshold
for when that access differs from, or is in excess of, the contractual grant
is the bane of defense attorneys and judges. 76
In a broad sense, the CFAA criminalizes both accessing a computer
“without authorization” and “exceeding authorized access” to a
computer. 77 The CFAA creates liability for a person who:
(1) “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information
from any protected computer,” in violation of § 1030(a)(2)(C);
(2) “knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected
computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access,
and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and
obtains anything of value,” in violation of § 1030(a)(4); or (3)
“intentionally accesses a protected computer without
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes
damage[,] or . . . causes damage and loss,” in violation of
§ 1030(a)(5)(B)-(C). 78
Prosecutors generally use the CFAA to pursue cases of computer
intrusion and hacking. 79 Often the cases involve the use of malware or
worms to penetrate a firewall in order to steal or destroy data. 80

75. See Brittany Johnson, Live Long and Prosper: How the Persistent and Increasing Popularity
of Fan Fiction Requires a New Solution in Copyright Law, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1645, 1679 (2016)
(“Terms of service exist on almost every website and form a type of contractual relationship
between the user and the website owner.”).
76. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1650–51 (discussing how the sensible discretion of prosecutors
and judges is frustrated due to confusing CFAA definitions as well as advances in computer
technology).
77. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (2012).
78. WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 2012).
79. See Kim Zetter, The Most Controversial Hacking Cases of the Past Decade, WIRED (Oct. 26,
2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/cfaa-computer-fraud-abuse-act-most-contro
versial-computer-hacking-cases/ [https://perma.cc/6QZ3-W483].
80. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1603.
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Additionally, prosecutors commonly included section 1030(a)(5)(A)
violations in Economic Espionage Act cases. 81
Table 1
CFAA Criminal Offenses and Statutory Sections

Offense

Statutory Section

Obtaining National Security
Information
Accessing a Computer and
Obtaining Information
Trespassing in a Government
Computer
Accessing to Defraud and Obtain
Value
Damaging a Computer or Information
Trafficking in Passwords
Threatening to Damage a Computer
Attempt and Conspiracy
Forfeiture

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)

2.

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3)
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)
18 U.S.C. § 1039(a)(6)
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(7)
18 U.S.C. § 1030(b)
18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(i) & (j)

Most Cases Hinge on the Court’s Interpretation of
“Authorization”

Congress did not define the phrase “without authorization” in the
CFAA. 82 This has led to a circuit split concerning the proper
interpretation of the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds
authorized access.” 83 Seven circuits have wrestled with the proper
interpretation for the meaning of “authorization” 84 since 2001. 85 The
81. See Graham M. Liccardi, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for Litigating Trade
Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 155, 157 (2008) (discussing the
use of the CFAA as a gap-filler).
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
83. See Ajuba Int’l, L.L.C. v. Saharia, 871 F. Supp. 2d 671, 685−86 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“The
split of authority specifically originates from competing interpretations of the terms ‘without
authorization’ and ‘exceeds authorized access’ . . . .”).
84. See United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 524 (2d Cir. 2015).
85. See id.; United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012); WEC Carolina Energy
Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258
(11th Cir. 2010); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); Int’l Airport Ctrs. v. Citrin,
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United States Supreme Court has recognized the CFAA’s
“authorization” as a word “of common usage, without any technical or
ambiguous meaning.” 86 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “authorization”
as “[o]fficial permission to do something.” 87
In International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. WernerMasuda, 88 the district court rejected both the broad interpretation of
authorization and the argument that an employee’s illegitimate use of
information obtained from a computer rendered the access
unauthorized. 89 Werner-Masuda, the defendant and a union officer, was
charged with exceeding her authorization to use a computer when she
violated a terms-of-use agreement that granted her access to a
membership list. 90 The court looked to the CFAA’s legislative history
and found that Congress intended the statute to apply primarily to
outside computer hackers rather than employees. 91 The court held that
even if the defendant breached a contract, that broken promise did not
mean her access to that information was unauthorized or criminal. 92
According to the Werner-Masuda court, the CFAA does not “prohibit
the unauthorized disclosure or use of information, but rather
unauthorized access. Nor do [its] terms proscribe authorized access for
unauthorized or illegitimate purposes.” 93
An en banc Ninth Circuit decision significantly limited the scope of
the CFAA in United States v. Nosal. 94 Nosal marked the first instance
where a federal circuit court held that that the government may not
prosecute so-called “insider” cases under the CFAA where the defendant
knowingly obtained or altered information for a purpose prohibited by
the computer owner. 95 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit articulated that its
interpretation of the CFAA was “a more sensible reading of the text and
legislative history of a statute whose general purpose is to punish
hacking—the circumvention of technological access barriers—not

440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir.
2001).
86. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1991).
87. Authorization, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 159 (10th ed. 2014).
88. 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 495−96 (D. Md. 2005).
89. See Brenton, supra note 40, at 437.
90. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 479–80.
91. See id. at 498–99.
92. Id. at 499.
93. Id.
94. 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
95. See id. at 863.
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misappropriation of trade secrets—a subject Congress has dealt with
elsewhere.” 96 The Nosal Court stated that a broader criminalization
based on use would impact more people 97 and the rule of lenity required
a narrower reading. 98 Judge Kozinski reasoned that “[b]asing criminal
liability on violations of private computer use polices can transform
whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into federal crimes
simply because a computer is involved.” 99
Recently, in United States v. Valle, 100 the Second Circuit settled on
the interpretation that “one ‘accesses a computer without authorization’
if he accesses a computer without permission to do so at all.” 101 The
court further interpreted “exceeds authorized access” as a limitation on
access and not on use. 102 In Valle, the defendant was a New York City
police officer charged with exceeding his authorized access to police
databases to find a woman he allegedly intended to kidnap and torture. 103
“It [was] undisputed that the NYPD’s policy, known to Valle, was that
these databases could only be accessed in the course of an officer’s
official duties and that accessing them for personal use violated
Department rules.” 104 He was convicted at trial and the district judge
denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. 105
The Second Circuit reversed and directed a judgment of acquittal,
stating the “[t]he dispositive question [was] whether Valle ‘exceeded
authorized access’ when he used his access to [police databases] to
conduct a search for [the intended kidnapping victim] with no law
enforcement purpose.” 106 The Second Circuit wanted to avoid
“criminaliz[ing] the conduct of millions of ordinary computer users.” 107
The court relied on the legislative history which “characterize[d] the evil
to be remedied—computer crime—as ‘trespass’ into computer systems
or data, and correspondingly describes ‘authorization’ in terms of the

96. Id.
97. Id. at 859 (“Were we to adopt the government’s proposed interpretation, millions of
unsuspecting individuals would find that they are engaging in criminal conduct.”).
98. Id. at 863.
99. Id. at 860.
100. 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015).
101. Id. at 524 (citing LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009)).
102. Id. at 527–28.
103. Id. at 512–13.
104. Id. at 513.
105. Id. at 515.
106. Id. at 523.
107. Id. at 527.
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portion of the computer’s data to which one’s access rights extend.” 108
Therefore, employees who, like Valle, had access but violated company
policy by using that access for a prohibited use would not trigger section
1030(a)(2) of the CFAA.
3.

Other Terms Like “Protected Computer,” “Damage,” and “Loss”
Broadened the Reach of CFAA Prosecution

The meaning of “protected computers” has also played a role in the
evolution of CFAA interpretation. 109 The CFAA prohibits unauthorized
access to “protected computers” 110 which are “used in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer
located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects
interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United
States.” 111 Any computer or device capable of connecting to the internet
is a “protected computer” within the CFAA’s scope. 112 Similarly, a
“protected computer” includes any computer connected to the
internet. 113 The Department of Justice has provided additional guidance
about the role the internet plays within elements of the CFAA:
Note that the computer must be “used in or affecting” not “used
by the defendant in”—that is, it is enough that the computer is
connected to the Internet; the statute does not require proof that
the defendant also used the Internet to access the computer or
used the computer to access the Internet. 114

108. Id. at 525.
109. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2167 (2004)
(noting that the term “protected computer” includes any computer connected to the internet).
110. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2012).
111. Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
112. See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030), 174 A.L.R. FED. 101, 1 (2001).
113. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849–50 (1997) (describing the internet as an
international network of interconnected computers); Paradigm Alliance, Inc. v. Celeritas Techs,
LLC, 248 F.R.D. 598, 602 (D. Kan. 2008) (“As a practical matter, a computer providing a ‘webbased’ application accessible through the internet would satisfy the ‘interstate communication’
requirement.”); Becker v. Toca, No. 07-7202, 2008 WL 4443050, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2008)
(concluding law firm’s allegation that its computers were connected to the internet satisfied the
statutory requirement that owners must at least use the computers in interstate commerce or
communication for protection); Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone, 230 F. Supp. 2d 890, 906 (N.D.
Ind. 2002) (finding computer used to send and receive e-mail to customers throughout the country
qualified as a protected computer).
114. DOJ MANUAL ON PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 23, at 4 (emphasis in
original).
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Unlike “authorization,” the CFAA defines both “damage” 115 and
“loss.” 116 Damage is “any impairment to the integrity or availability of
data, a program, a system, or information,” 117 and encompasses injury to
the computer itself, its software, or the information stored on it. Loss is
“any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to
an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data,
program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and
any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred
because of interruption of service.” 118 The destruction or deletion of data
generally constitutes damage under the Act. 119
C.

Prosecutors Have Used the CFAA to Deter Undesirable, Yet Legal,
Conduct

Many commentators see abuses of prosecutorial discretion for three
purposes: (1) to punish morally outrageous conduct; 120 (2) to protect
private business interests; 121 and (3) to intimidate and chill political
activists. 122
1.

Prosecutors Use the CFAA to Prosecute Morally Outrageous
Conduct When No Other Statute Prohibits the Conduct

Legal scholars criticize the CFAA for inviting prosecutors to abuse
their discretion. 123 In the highly-publicized “MySpace Mom”

115. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2012)).
116. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1030(e) (2012)).
117. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2012).
118. Id. § 1030(e)(11).
119. See, e.g., B & B Microscopes v. Armogida, 532 F. Supp. 2d 744, 758 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
(finding that deletions that make data unavailable to the plaintiff are damage within the statutory
definition).
120. See Kristin Westerhorstmann, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Protecting the United
States from Cyber-Attacks, Fake Dating Profiles, and Employees Who Check Facebook at Work, 5
U. MIAMI NAT’L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 145, 152 (2015).
121. See Brenton, supra note 40.
122. See Sarah A. Constant, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Prosecutor’s Dream and a
Hacker’s Worst Nightmare—The Case Against Aaron Swartz and the Need to Reform the CFAA, 16
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 231 (2013).
123. See id.; Hanni Fakhoury, The Matthew Keys Case, the CFAA, and Why Maximum Sentences
Matter, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/03/3-months
-or-35-years-understanding-cfaa-sentencing-part-1-why-maximums-matter [https://perma.cc/6LXXC9VN].
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cyberbullying case, 124 defendant Lori Drew and others allegedly seduced
a young girl using a fake profile of a teenage boy and then told the girl
that “the world would be a better place without [her] in it,” in an effort to
hurt her emotionally, resulting in the girl committing suicide. 125 At the
time, Drew’s conduct was not a criminal act under Missouri law. 126 The
absence of any state or federal charges sparked outrage in the
community and among virtual vigilantes—Drew’s home address, phone
numbers, email address, and photos were posted online for purposes of
sending threats; calls were made to the family members’ employers to
call for their termination; the family was even “swatted,” whereby a call
was placed to their local police department giving their address as the
location of a murder in progress so police would break in. 127
After about six months of protests and pleas to bring charges against
Lori Drew, the government charged Drew under the CFAA for the
intentional breach of a website’s user agreement. 128 The government
argued the creation of a false profile amounted to a criminal violation of
the CFAA. 129 Ultimately, the court rejected the argument and declined to
extend criminal penalties to a violation of a website’s terms of service.130
The court reasoned that the government’s theory was inconsistent with
the original purpose of the CFAA, which was to prevent hackers from
interfering with federal interest computers. 131 For these reasons, the
judge acquitted Drew in 2009 after she was convicted by the jury. 132
Drew highlights the tension between the retributivist desire to seek
justice for victims and the belief that a private contractual breach opens
the door to federal criminal indictments. Many proponents of CFAA
124. See Ars Staff, “MySpace Mom” Lori Drew’s Conviction Thrown Out, ARSTECHNICA (July
2, 2009, 2:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/07/myspace-mom-lori-drews-conviction
-thrown-out/ [https://perma.cc/CER8-QLMS].
125. Indictment, United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CR080582), 2008
WL 2078622.
126. See Andrew M. Henderson, High-Tech Words Do Hurt: A Modern Makeover Expands
Missouri’s Harassment Law to Include Electronic Communications, 74 MO. L. REV. 379, 380
(2009) (“Despite Josh Evan’s deceitful actions, no state charges were brought against any
individuals involved in Megan’s death. This is because the behavior that prompted Megan to
commit suicide was not a criminal act under Missouri law.”).
127. See P.J. Huffstutter, A Town Fights Back in MySpace Suicide Case, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 22,
2007), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-myspace22nov22-story.html [https://perma.cc/C9QXNQFQ].
128. Id.; Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 451.
129. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 451.
130. Id. at 461.
131. Id. at 460.
132. Id. at 449.
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reform remained loyal to their belief that prosecutors abused the CFAA,
even in the face of Drew’s morally reprehensible conduct.133
Proponents of CFAA reform similarly did not favor a court granting a
warrant based on probable cause of violation of a terms of service
agreement. 134 In 2009, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a civil
liberties nonprofit and vocal advocate for CFAA reform, defended
computer science student Riccardo Calixte in a state action brought
under a Massachusetts law derived from the CFAA. 135 Prosecutors
suspected Calixte sent an email to a school mailing list claiming that his
dorm roommate was gay. 136 Prosecutors alleged that Calixte sent two
false emails; downloaded illegal files; and gained unauthorized access to
the college grading system. 137 As a result, local police seized his
computers, cellphone and iPod, claiming that he violated criminal law by
giving a fake name on his Yahoo account profile. 138 The EFF argued that
the sending of a fraudulent or misleading email did not support the claim
that the defendant defrauded a commercial computer service.139
2.

Private Sector Companies Try to Enforce Contracts with Federal
Criminal Laws

CFAA critics have also railed against cases where it appears
prosecutors used criminal law primarily to enforce private website
133. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Elec. Frontier Found., et al. in support of Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State an Offense and for Vagueness, United States v.
Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 451 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CR-08-0582-GW), https://www.eff.org/
document/amicus-brief-support-defendant [https://perma.cc/L39H-EBHS]; Eric Goldman, The
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Is a Failed Experiment, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2013, 4:21 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/03/28/the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-is-a-failedexperiment/ [https://perma.cc/MTP4-M8PP]; Kaveh Waddell, Aaron’s Law Reintroduced as
Lawmakers Wrestle over Hacking Penalties, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/aarons-law-reintroduced-as-lawmakerswrestle-over-hacking-penalties/458535/ [https://perma.cc/6VQB-Z34R].
134. See Matt Zimmerman, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Tosses Out Warrant in Boston
College Case, Says No Probable Cause Existed, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 22, 2009),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/05/mass-sjc-tosses-calixte-warrant
[https://perma.cc/CYY3H3LL]; In re: Matter of a Search Warrant Executed on March 30, 2009 at the Residence of Movant
Riccardo Calixte, Memorandum of Decision and Order, In re Riccardo Calixte, No. SJ-2009-0212
(Mass. May 21, 2009), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/inresearchBC/sjccalixteorder.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y5MH-UATG].
135. In Re: Matter of Search Warrant (Boston College), ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/cases/re-matter-search-warrant-boston-college [https://perma.cc/UH22-RW3Q].
136. See In re: Matter of a Search Warrant, supra note 134.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. In re: Matter of a Search Warrant, supra note 134.
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operators’ terms of service. In these cases, damage or loss resulting from
the act harms the website operators. 140 However, only the broader
interpretation, where a violation of a terms of service is immediately
considered unauthorized access, provides the basis for a CFAA
violation.
In United States v. Lowson, 141 the government charged the operators
of Wiseguys Tickets, Inc. with violating the CFAA by using bots to
purchase event tickets to resell them. 142 Even though this conduct
arguably harms consumers and the ticketing market, reform advocates
still defended Wiseguys. The EFF argued that “[c]riminal punishment
cannot be based on the vagaries of privately created, frequently unread,
generally lengthy and impenetrable terms of service implemented to
further the business interest of e-commerce sites, and not necessarily the
public interest.” 143 The EFF acknowledged that fans “might not like the
defendants,” 144 whose bot would automatically purchase posted tickets
to resell at a higher price, and that even “[l]egislators agree . . . with
consumers that the ticket market is broken.” 145 However, the
ramifications of criminalizing terms of service violations concerned the
EFF. The EFF argued that “public websites cannot decide who is and is
not a criminal.” 146 The EFF has used the same argument in defense of
terms of service violators in civil CFAA cases. 147 Although the court

140. See, e.g., United States v. Lowson, Crim. No. 10-114 (KSH), 2010 WL 9552416, at *8
(D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010) (“The pleaded damage element of at least $5,000 involves defendants’
blocking out authorized, individual users from the website by using CAPTCHA Bots, which
‘seized’ the best seats for events and made those seats unavailable for purchase or consideration
until their release by a Wiseguys employee.”).
141. Id. at *1.
142. Id.
143. Brief for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, United States v.
Lowson 20, No. 10-114 (KSH), 2010 WL 9552416 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010), https://www.eff.org/
files/filenode/us_v_lowson/lowsonamicusbrieffinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BSD-K8MV].
144. Jennifer Granick, CFAA Prosecution of Wiseguys Not So Smart, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(July 2, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/07/cfaa-prosecution-wiseguys-not-so-smart
[https://perma.cc/F65S-5WUN].
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Brief of Elect. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants,
Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Nos. 13-17102, 1317154), 2014 WL 1004574 (“Enforcing private website operators’ preferences with criminal law
puts immense coercive power behind terms and conditions, and technological measures that may be
contrary to the interests of consumers and the public.”). The conduct in this case was the
defendant’s creation of a tool for users to aggregate their own information stored on Facebook.
Facebook claimed that the tool violated criminal law because Facebook’s terms of service “require
users to refrain from using automated scripts to collect information from or otherwise interact with
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agreed that the issue of what constitutes criminal fraud in an internet
context was “perplexing,” 148 the court denied Lowson’s motion to
dismiss, stating it “will be in a far better position to meet that challenge
after the government presents its evidence.”149 The parties later settled
the case out of court prior to a trial. 150
3.

Prosecutors Try to Use the CFAA Against Free-Culture Activists
and Civil Disobedience Actors

Internet freedom and data protection goals often conflict.151 Internet
activists have argued that the CFAA “has been used to attack anonymity,
pseudonymity, data portability and other consumer rights.” 152 Perhaps
the most prominent case on this issue was the prosecution of computer
programming prodigy 153 Aaron Swartz, a self-described “writer, hacker
and activist,” 154 who committed suicide while facing felony charges
including offenses under the CFAA. Prosecutors indicted Aaron Swartz
in July 2011 for “allegedly attempting to download all of the
electronically archived materials maintained by JSTOR while accessing
them through a computer network operated by the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.” 155
As part of a fellowship, Harvard provided Swartz with access to
JSTOR’s services and archives, a not-for-profit digital library that
offered paid subscribers access to 2,000 academic journals, as needed for
his research. 156 Swartz downloaded nearly 4.8 million articles; 157
Facebook . . . .” Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1028 (N.D. Cal.
2012)).
148. United States v. Lowson, No. 10-114 (KSH), 2010 WL 9552416, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 12,
2010).
149. Id.
150. See Peter F. Bariso III, No Need to Fear Robots: Online “Bot” Use Under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, SETON HALL LAW, LAW SCHOOL STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP PAPER 757, 21–22
(2016), http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1771&context=student_scholarship
[https://perma.cc/KU6R-NMJQ].
151. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1649.
152. Granick, supra note 144.
153. Swartz had been involved with data and content distribution technology since age fourteen,
when he helped developed the software behind RSS feeds. See Noam Cohen, ‘Free Culture’
Advocate May Pay High Price, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/
business/media/aaron-swartzs-web-activism-may-cost-him-dearly.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
154. Government’s Consolidated Response to Defendant’s Motions to Suppress, United States v.
Swartz, 945 F. Supp. 2d. 216 (D. Mass. 2013) (No. 11-10260-NMG), 2012 WL 6107933.
155. United States v. Swartz, 945 F. Supp. 2d 216, 217 (D. Mass. 2013).
156. Government’s Consolidated Response to Defendant’s Motions to Suppress, United States v.
Swartz, 945 F. Supp. 2d. 216 (D. Mass. 2013) (No. 11-10260-NMG), 2012 WL 6107933.
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however, he never shared them with anyone. 158 Many technology
activists thought his conduct in downloading the articles may have been
research for civil disobedience, perhaps because Swartz strongly
believed that publicly funded research publications should be free to the
public. 159
While facing federal trial in early 2013, Aaron Swartz committed
suicide. 160 Many pointed the finger at prosecutor Carmen Ortiz, accusing
her of trying to win at all costs by abusing prosecutorial discretion to
bully and intimidate 161 Swartz with demands for up to thirty-five years
in prison. 162 As one critic put it: “[t]his makes no sense . . . . It’s like
trying to put someone in jail for allegedly checking too many books out
of the library.” 163
The loss of Aaron Swartz was a tragedy for the free culture
community, which views itself as striving to preserve free speech and
information-sharing over the internet, as well as protecting technology
innovators who often find genius in their work through hacking and
testing. 164 “How information is able to be distributed over the
Internet . . . is the free speech battle of our times.” 165 Columbia Law
School Professor Tim Wu briefly summed up the answer to whether
Swartz would have shared the scientific articles with the world or would
have used the articles to develop the next technological leap in digital
content management: “[n]ow we will never know.” 166
After Swartz’s death, there was an outpouring of calls to reform the
CFAA. For example, the EFF submitted a proposal seeking to remove
redundancies and double-counting offenses, as well as, making more of

157. JSTOR Evidence in United States vs. Aaron Swartz, JSTOR (July 30, 2013),
http://docs.jstor.org/summary.html [https://perma.cc/W4H3-NAW5].
158. Cohen, supra note 153.
159. See Tim Wu, How the Legal System Failed Aaron Swartz—And Us, NEW YORKER (Jan. 14,
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-legal-system-failed-aaron-swartzandus [https://perma.cc/KZC4-E8Y7].
160. John Swartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently a Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/aaron-swartz-internetactivist-dies-at-26.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
161. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Prosecutor as Bully, LESSIG BLOG, V2 (Jan. 12, 2013),
http://lessig.tumblr.com/post/40347463044/prosecutor-as-bully [https://perma.cc/8XZP-EJ4L].
162. See Wu, supra note 159.
163. Cohen, supra note 153.
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Glenn Greenwald).
166. Wu, supra note 159.
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the CFAA violations misdemeanors. 167 The EFF opens its proposal with
a message about Aaron Swartz:
In the wake of social justice activist Aaron Swartz’s tragic
death, Internet users around the country are taking a hard look at
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the federal antihacking law. As we’ve noted, the CFAA has many
problems . . . . As Aaron’s case indicated, the CFAA’s current
broad language and draconian penalty scheme allow
overreaching prosecutors to abuse their discretion. This can turn
minor incidents with no real harm into serious criminal
prosecutions, with the threat of long prison sentences and the
consequences that go along with a felony conviction—like not
being able to vote. 168
Legislators also tried to reform the CFAA following Swartz’s
death. 169 In 2013, Senators Ron Wyden and Rand Paul, along with
Representative Zoe Lofgren, introduced Aaron’s Law. 170 The bill sought
to resolve the circuit split, prevent a breach of contract from becoming a
criminal violation, and bring greater proportionality to CFAA
penalties. 171 “I see ‘Aaron’s Law’ as common sense fixes that should be
enacted to stop the kinds of abuse Aaron was subjected to from affecting
others,” Representative Lofgren wrote on Reddit, 172 an online forum
with a loyal user base with which Swartz was involved. 173 The House

167. Cindy Cohn, et al., Rebooting Computer Crime Part 3: The Punishment Should Fit the
Crime, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/02/rebootingcomputer-crime-part-3-punishment-should-fit-crime [https://perma.cc/6ZGL-9LY8]; see also EFF
CFAA Revisions—Penalties and Access, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/document
/eff-cfaa-revisions-penalties-and-access [https://perma.cc/5H59-HDUF].
168. Cohn, supra note 167.
169. Cindy Cohn, Aaron’s Law Reintroduced: CFAA Didn’t Fix Itself, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/04/aarons-law-reintroduced-cfaa-didnt-fixitself [https://perma.cc/E3AK-62XQ].
170. Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. § 4; Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, S. 1196,
113th Cong. § 4.
171. Zoe Lofgen & Ron Wyden, Introducing Aaron’s Law, A Desperately Needed Reform of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, WIRED (June 20, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/
2013/06/aarons-law-is-finally-here/ [https://perma.cc/8TZ4-H773].
172. Zoe Lofgen, I’m Rep Zoe Lofgren, Here Is a Modified Draft Version of Aaron’s Law
Reflecting the Internet’s Input, REDDIT (June 20, 2013, 9:30 AM), https://www.reddit.com/
r/IAmA/comments/17pisv/im_rep_zoe_lofgren_here_is_a_modified_draft/ [https://perma.cc/85LPNRXJ].
173. See Swartz, supra note 160.
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never scheduled Aaron’s Law for a debate or vote; 174 however, the bill
was re-introduced in the 2015 legislative session. 175
II.

CFAA REFORM SHOULD LOOK TO THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT AND EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY

A.

Eighth Amendment History Suggests Congress is the Appropriate
Branch to Address CFAA Reform

Many of the challenges in applying the CFAA stem from changes in
how individuals use technology rather than amendments to the CFAA
itself. Even though Congress determined that certain conduct warranted
punishment at the time of enactment, what matters for an Eighth
Amendment analysis is the CFAA’s application today. 176 “The [Eighth]
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 177 Ultimately, the
Eighth Amendment itself is not the appropriate vehicle to force CFAA
reform through the judicial system. However, the Eighth Amendment
provides principles that can help shape a framework for CFAA reform.
Congress took the text of the Eighth Amendment almost verbatim
from the English Declaration of Rights, which provided that “excessive
Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell
and unusuall Punishments inflicted.” 178 English law was familiar with
the principle of proportionality at the time the founders drafted the
Declaration of Rights.179 The Magna Carta provided that “[a] free man
shall not be fined for a small offence, except in proportion to the
measure of the offense; and for a great offence he shall be fined in
proportion to the magnitude of the offence, saving his freehold.” 180
However, the drafters of the Declaration of Rights did not explicitly
prohibit “disproportionate” or “excessive” punishments. 181 Some courts
174. See Thomas Fox-Brewster, Aaron’s Law Is Doomed Leaving US Hacking Law ‘Broken’,
FORBES (Aug. 6, 2016, 9:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2014/08/06/aaronslaw-is-doomed-leaving-us-hacking-law-broken/ [https://perma.cc/27QZ-7788].
175. See Aaron’s Law Act of 2015, H.R. 1918, 114th Cong.
176. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (“The Court recognized . . . that the words
of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static.”).
177. Id. at 101.
178. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983).
179. See id. at 285−86.
180. MAGNA CARTA, https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation
[https://perma.cc/DP8Y-FMKG].
181. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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have found it unlikely that the Cruel and Unusual Clause prohibited
disproportionate punishments. 182
However, the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment
has a “narrow proportionality principle” that “applies to noncapital
sentences.” 183 In Rummel v. Estelle, 184 the Court held that Texas did not
violate the Eighth Amendment by sentencing a three-time offender to
life in prison with the possibility of parole. 185 The Court noted that it had
“on occasion stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of a
sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.” 186
Successful challenges to the proportionality of noncapital sentences are
“exceedingly rare.” 187 Courts have upheld many components of criminal
justice, such as mandatory minimums, three-strikes laws, pre-trial
detention for dangerousness and risk-based sentencing. 188
In 2003, the Supreme Court considered the grossly disproportionate
test, specifically in the context of recidivist statutes. 189 In Ewing v.
California, the state of California sentenced the defendant to twentyfive-years-to-life for stealing three golf clubs. 190 “The Court held that the
sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment, 191 resting its decision
on two fundamental principles: (1) deference to the legislature and (2)
identifying the sentence’s penological purpose.” 192 The plurality opinion
recognized that the legislature is primarily responsible for determining

182. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 974 (1991) (“There is even less likelihood that
proportionality of punishment was one of the traditional ‘rights and privileges of Englishmen’ apart
from the Declaration of Rights, which happened to be included in the Eighth Amendment.”).
183. Id. at 996–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
184. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
185. Id. at 284–85.
186. Id. at 271.
187. Id. at 272.
188. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life
for third-strike theft of three golf clubs, with pro-incapacity rhetoric); United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding pre-trial detention for dangerousness); Rummel, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)
(upholding life sentence for third minor felony fraud against Eighth Amendment challenge,
ostensibly on basis of incapacitation); see also Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the
Preventive State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 361 (2015).
189. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20 (plurality opinion).
190. Id. at 28.
191. Id. at 30.
192. Christopher J. DeClue, Sugarcoating the Eighth Amendment: The Grossly Disproportionate
Test Is Simply the Fourteenth Amendment Rational Basis Test in Disguise, 41 SW. L. REV. 533, 543
(2012).
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which conduct society condemns and the punishment for that conduct. 193
The Court is not a “superlegislature.” 194
The Court upheld the sentence and reasoned that California had “a
reasonable basis” for believing that severe sentences imposed on career
criminals substantially advance the goals of its justice system. 195 It
recognized that “[r]ecidivism has long been . . . a legitimate basis for
increased punishment.” 196 The Court further explained that punishing
repeat offenders so severely served the purposes of deterrence and
incapacitation. 197 It also recognized that other theories may justify a
sentence, such as rehabilitation and retribution. 198
Also in 2003, the Supreme Court addressed the grossly
disproportionate test in Lockyer v. Andrade. 199 In Andrade, the Court
upheld two consecutive twenty-five-years-to-life sentences imposed on a
defendant convicted of stealing $150 worth of video tapes from two
different stores 200 after the defendant sought habeas corpus relief. 201 The
Court held that the lower courts correctly relied on Rummel 202 in holding
that the sentence was constitutional. 203 The Court did express concern
regarding the grossly disproportionate test, noting that “we have not
established a clear or consistent path for the courts to follow” 204 and
“precedents in this area have not been a model of clarity.” 205
Generally, courts show deference to legislative determinations
regarding what conduct to criminalize and the severity of the punishment
to impose when determining whether a noncapital sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment. 206 This deference provides significant obstacles for
defendants challenging their sentences. 207 The separation of powers

193. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24.
194. Id. at 28.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 25.
197. Id. at 26.
198. Id. at 25.
199. 538 U.S. 63, 74 (2003).
200. Id. at 66.
201. Id. at 69.
202. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
203. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73–74.
204. Id. at 72.
205. Id.
206. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23−25 (2003).
207. See Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment
to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 147 (2007).
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doctrine drives the Court’s hands-off approach. The federal system
recognizes the independent power of a legislature to articulate societal
views through criminal law. 208 Each state’s government and the federal
government have the sovereign authority to enact and enforce criminal
laws individually tailored to fit their respective jurisdictions. 209 In this
way, penal systems reflect what criminal conduct individual states feel
warrant punishment.
The Supreme Court also recognized that the legislature is the branch
of government best equipped to determine the severity of particular
crimes and the appropriate sentence to impose. 210 Therefore, courts
rarely invalidate sentences. 211 Societies may pressure legislatures to
generate criminal codes that differ from each other because they reflect
different societal values. 212 In Harmelin v. Michigan, Justice Kennedy
explained that “differing attitudes and perceptions of local conditions
may yield different, yet rational, conclusions regarding the appropriate
length of prison terms for particular crimes.” 213
A number of cases provide prominent examples of the broad
deference courts grant to state legislatures in determining criminal
penalties. In United States v. Angelos, 214 the defendant sold bags of
marijuana to government informants on several occasions. 215 In two of
the drug sales, a gun was visible. 216 However, prosecutors presented no
evidence that the defendant used the gun or threatened to use it. 217 In that
case, federal law required the judge to impose a fifty-five year

208. See McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991).
209. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[L]egislatures
have the power to prescribe punishments for crimes.”).
210. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Determinations about the nature and purposes of punishment for criminal acts implicate difficult
and enduring questions respecting the sanctity of the individual, the nature of law, and the relation
between law and the social order.”); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (“Reviewing courts,
of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily
possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion
that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals.”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274
(1980) (“[T]he length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative
prerogative . . . .”).
211. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285.
212. See Hutto v Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 380 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that
sentencing disparity is inevitable because trial courts make sentencing decisions).
213. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
214. 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004), aff’d, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006).
215. Id. at 1231.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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sentence. 218 If prosecutors charged the defendant in state court, based on
state sentencing guidelines for Utah, his conviction would have given
him a standard range of four to seven years. 219
In United States v. Yirkovsky, 220 the Eighth Circuit held that a fifteenyear sentence for possession of a single bullet was not cruel and unusual
punishment. 221 The court noted that “[t]he facts of Yirkovsky warrant
recitation, because they demonstrate how deferential the judiciary is to
legislative determinations of proper punishment.” 222 While remodeling a
house, the defendant found a .22 caliber bullet and placed the bullet in a
box in his bedroom. 223 Later, the defendant’s former girlfriend filed a
complaint alleging the defendant possessed her property. 224 When the
defendant authorized the police to search his room, the police found the
bullet. 225 The possession of the bullet subjected the defendant to a
fifteen-year mandatory sentence since he had three prior felony
convictions, and the Eighth Circuit upheld the sentence. 226 The court
recognized that the penalty was extreme, but its “hands [were] tied in
[the] matter by the mandatory minimum sentence which Congress
established.” 227 Lower courts have adhered to a rebuttable presumption
that a sentence within the statutory limits is constitutional.228
The Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are
grossly disproportionate to the crime. 229 The Eighth Amendment can
provide a useful framework for reforming the CFAA. The principles
could guide courts to a reasonable application of the CFAA to novel
computer uses by comparing the proportionality of the offense and the
sentence.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1242.
259 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 705.
Phillips v. Iowa, 185 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1020 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Yirkovsky, 259 F.3d 704, 707 n.4 (8th Cir. 2001).
See, e.g., United States v. Atteberry, 447 F.3d 562, 565 (8th Cir. 2006).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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The Seriousness of a CFAA Offense and the Severity of its
Punishment Often Do Not Align Due to Legislative Lag

The CFAA’s tiered penalties often give prosecutors wide discretion to
increase the sentence severity. 230 Several legislators 231 have recognized
the opportunity for abuse of prosecutorial discretion and have proposed
legislation to curb this power. 232 However, until Congress amends the
CFAA or a case makes its way to the United States Supreme Court, a
circuit split on the role of civil precedents in criminal CFAA cases will
persist.
The need for inherently subjective comparisons is a challenge for
courts in applying a proportionality test between the severity of the
offense and the sentence. 233 Some courts have opted not to consider
sentence severity, characterizing it as “purely a matter of legislative
prerogative.” 234 These courts leave the severity determinations to
Congress to determine the seriousness of a given offense and the
appropriate punishment.
1.

Technology Norms Should Be Considered When Evaluating the
Seriousness of a CFAA Offense

As discussed in Part I, emerging technologies outpace the CFAA and
render its language vague and highly controversial. Unforeseen
technologies and increasing electronic interconnectedness 235 create a
seemingly moving scale of how society views computer conduct. While
one could list many reasons for Congress’s delayed or gridlocked
attempts to keep laws current, the resulting lag forces courts to continue
to deal with sentencing disproportionality.
Without guidance from the Supreme Court, circuit courts may not
resolve these disproportionality concerns. Courts are struggling to
straddle the increasingly widening gap in the language of the CFAA and

230. See Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Lofgren, Wyden, Paul Introduce
Bipartisan, Bicameral Aaron’s Law to Reform Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (Apr. 21, 2015),
https://lofgren.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=397911 [https://perma.cc/7JW5GFG8] [hereinafter Aaron’s Law Press Release].
231. See Aaron’s Law Act of 2015, H.R. 1918, 144th Cong. (list of co-sponsors).
232. See Aaron’s Law Press Release, supra note 230.
233. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980).
234. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274.
235. See, e.g., Sean Gallagher, The Future Is the Internet of Things—Deal with It, ARSTECHNICA
(Oct. 29, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/unite/2015/10/the-future-is-the-internet-of-thingsdeal-with-it/ [https://perma.cc/7948-5ELH].
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its applicability to modern technology use. For example, the recent
decision in United States v. Valle deepened the circuit split on the CFAA
authorized access issue. 236 The Second, 237 Fourth 238 and Ninth 239
Circuits have adopted a narrow interpretation of exceeding authorized
access and the First, 240 Fifth, 241 Seventh 242 and Eleventh 243 Circuits have
adopted a broad interpretation. 244 This indicates some courts are using
statutory construction to resolve the sentencing severity with Congress’s
likely original intent. One should not assume that the seriousness of an
offense is inextricably tied to the sentence severity. This assumption
would lead to a circular result that precludes applying the proportionality
test. 245

236. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015). In Valle, the defendant was a New York
City police officer who prosecutors charged with exceeding his authorized access to police
databases to find a woman he allegedly intended to kidnap and torture. It was undisputed that the
NYPD’s policy, known to Valle, only allowed these databases to be accessed in the course of an
officer’s official duties, and that accessing them for personal use violated Department rules. The
Second Circuit wanted to avoid criminalizing the conduct of millions of ordinary computer users.
237. Id.
238. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012)
(discussing the circuit split and justifying the decision on the rule of lenity).
239. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing how interpretation can
turn an anti-hacking statute into a misappropriation statute).
240. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2001). The First
Circuit held that EF’s implied authorization to website users did not extend to the use of all of the
information contained on the website. The court found that Explorica’s conduct “reek[ed] of use—
and, indeed, abuse—of proprietary information.” Id.
241. United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010). The Fifth Circuit upheld criminal
convictions where a former employee misused customer account information for a fraudulent
scheme and thereby exceeded authorization. Id.
242. Int’l Airport Ctrs. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit ruled that
Citrin’s authorization terminated when he breached his duty of loyalty by quitting, and that he
exceeded authorized access by deleting the data on his work laptop before returning it. Id.
243. United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010). The Eleventh Circuit found an
employee of the Social Security Administration criminally liable for using private information about
several women from the employer’s computer databases for personal reasons. This conduct was in
violation of a company policy. Id.
244. See supra section I.B.
245. See, e.g., David S. Mackey, Rationality Versus Proportionality: Reconsidering the
Constitutional Limits on Criminal Sanctions, 51 TENN. L. REV. 623, 638 (1984) (suggesting that the
“use of the term [proportionality] suggests the development of a constitutional requirement that
sentences be imposed on the basis of the particular culpability of an offender and not on the grounds
of some independent social goal”).
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Vagueness Blurs the Tort-Felony Line

Congress attempted to denote the seriousness of an offense through
the CFAA’s misdemeanor/felony distinction. The basic offense of
improperly using a computer to obtain information is only a
misdemeanor. 246 However, the violation becomes a felony when a user
takes the information to gain a commercial advantage, to gain a private
financial benefit, or to commit another crime or tort. 247 This indicates
that Congress intended to increase the punishment for more culpable
actors. Unfortunately, felony-triggering conduct easily includes many
common and insignificant acts in today’s online world.
The broad scope of misdemeanor conduct encompassed under the
CFAA means sentencing can be very severe for offenses that are not.
The EFF compiled a list of common, innocuous-yet-criminal behavior
highlighting the surprising breadth of the CFAA. 248 For example, the
EFF warns users about password-sharing: “before you give your
significant other your Pandora password, consider whether he or she is
someone you want to put on your visitor’s list should you end up in
prison.” 249 Even the Ninth Circuit criticized the prosecution in Drew, 250
citing it as an example of prosecutorial excess in applying the broad
interpretation of the term “exceeding authorization” based on terms of
service violations. 251 It is unlikely that Congress intended the CFAA to
make even minor violations of a terms of service agreement a criminal
offense.
Similarly, the technological tide washed away the line Congress drew
to distinguish felonious conduct. It is felony-triggering conduct “when a
user takes the information to gain a commercial advantage, to gain a

246. National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1995, S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 8
(1996).
247. Id.
248. Hofmann & Reitman, supra note 6.
249. Id.
250. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (rejecting arguments that a breach
of contract should not be a basis for a CFAA violation because the CFAA requires that the
intentional accessing further criminal or tortious act).
251. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“[I]f Congress meant to
expand the scope of criminal liability to everyone who uses a computer in violation of computer use
restrictions—which may well include everyone who uses a computer—we would expect it to use
language better suited to that purpose.”) In Nosal, the Ninth Circuit held that the government may
not prosecute “insider” cases under the CFAA. The court held that the rule of lenity would require a
narrowed reading because a broader criminalization based on use would impact more unsuspecting
people. Id.
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private financial benefit, or to commit another crime or tort.” 252 Using
Drew as an example, the indictment alleged that Drew intentionally
inflicted emotional distress by bullying a teenage MySpace user.253
Given that the MySpace Terms of Service prohibit criminal and tortious
activity, this bullying formed the basis for the CFAA crime of exceeding
authorization. 254 The court held that this would “mak[e] the website
owner—in essence—the party who ultimately defines the criminal
conduct” 255 and “will lead to further vagueness problems.” 256
The vagueness problems continue to expand when other felonytriggering acts are considered. For example, sharing someone else’s
photo online may infringe copyright and violate the website’s terms of
service. 257 The terms violation serves as the act of exceeding
authorization, and the copyright violation transforms the conduct into a
potential felony.
One company even used the CFAA to enjoin a defendant from
visiting a publicly accessible site, 258 raising First Amendment
concerns. 259 In short, Congress’s attempt to distinguish more culpable
computer conduct from the more innocuous activities has failed to stand
the test of time, producing charges and convictions for activities
Congress did not intend to cover.

252. Christopher Dodson, Authorized: The Case for Duty of Loyalty Suits Against Former
Employees Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 207, 215 (2012).
253. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452. The Ninth Circuit was highly critical of the prosecution in Drew—
where the indictment alleged that Drew’s conduct was for the purpose of committing the tortious act
of intentional infliction of emotional distress by bullying a teenage MySpace user—and declined to
apply the broad interpretation of the term exceeding authorization.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 465.
256. Id.
257. See Eric Goldman, Lori Drew Prosecuted for CFAA Violations–Some Comments, and a
Practice Pointer, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (May 23, 2008), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/
2008/05/lori_drew_prose.htm [https://perma.cc/4EJW-U2RN].
258. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (enjoining
defendant from accessing publicly available information on plaintiff’s website).
259. See Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320, 323
(2004).
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Congress Designed the CFAA’s Sentencing Scheme to Deter
Computer Crime, but Not Breach of Contract

Commentators also criticize the CFAA for allowing “heavy-handed”
prosecution. 260 Under the current scheme,
[e]ven first-time offenses for accessing a protected computer
without sufficient ‘authorization’ can be punishable by up to
five years in prison each (ten years for repeat offenses), plus
fines. Violations of other parts of the CFAA are punishable by
up to ten years, 20 years, and even life in prison. 261
These punishments are similar to sentences for selling or importing
drugs. 262
CFAA felony charges reveal a disconnect between conduct and
sentence severity, such as in Aaron Swartz’s indictment. 263 Felony
convictions can result in the loss of the right to own a firearm or to
vote. 264 Some felony convictions can get non-U.S. citizens automatically
deported. 265 “Ex-offenders may also find themselves ineligible for
educational benefits, military service, commercial driving licenses, gun
possession, and other civil rights. Many forfeit their parental rights.” 266
In addition to longer prison sentences, the “convicted felon” label comes
with a social stigma. 267
Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig argued that the felony label
distressed Aaron Swartz. 268 Friend Quinn Norton also wrote about the
impact of the felony conviction on Swartz:
We talked about it, about what a felony count would mean to
him, to his life and his dreams in politics . . . . To be a felon in
this country is to be a pariah, to be unlistened to. Aaron wanted

260. Aaron’s Law Press Release, supra note 230.
261. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Reform, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/
issues/cfaa [https://perma.cc/D67J-QWPT].
262. Joseph P. Daly, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—A New Perspective: Let the
Punishment Fit the Damage, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 445, 459 (1993) (explaining
that sliding-scale aggravating factor schemes are used as a strong deterrence mechanism).
263. See infra Part III.
264. Daniel Weeks, Should Felons Lose the Right to Vote?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/should-felons-lose-the-right-to-vote/282846/
[https://perma.cc/72MR-PGMU].
265. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012) (Deportable Aliens).
266. Weeks, supra note 264.
267. See Cohn, supra note 167 (“Beyond this is the tremendous social stigma that comes with the
label of ‘convicted felon.’”).
268. See Lessig, supra note 161.
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more than anything to speak to power, to make reforms in the
very system that was attacking him now. In most states a felon
can’t even vote. The thought of him not voting was
unfathomable. 269
The sentencing scheme has strong deterrent effects, and so one can
reasonably assume Congress intended to curb outside hackers, not online
users who overstay their welcome.
D.

Online Conduct More Easily Violates Existing Law and More
Often Results in Severe Punishment than Analogous Offline
Conduct

Some courts compare CFAA punishments to the sentences for the
same criminal act under a different criminal statute. 270 The purpose of
this comparative analysis was “to validate an initial judgment that a
sentence is grossly disproportionate to a crime.” 271 In Solem v. Helm, 272
the Court compared the penalty issued with penalties that defendant
could have received had he committed the same crime in other
jurisdictions. 273 The disproportionality of the sentence persuaded the
Court. The fact that the defendant could have received the same penalty
of life without parole in only one other state convinced the Court the
sentence was disproportionate. 274 Similarly, in Harmelin, a comparison
to other jurisdictions showed that the defendant received a tougher
sentence in Michigan than he could have received in any other state.275
Crimes under the CFAA do not have perfect offline analogs.
However, the CFAA does share in traditional notions of property and
privacy, and in some cases the online/offline comparison can still prove
useful. For example, the CFAA now often reaches trade secret
misappropriation. 276 If an employee extracts data through digital means

269. Quinn Norton, Life Inside the Aaron Swartz Investigation, ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/03/life-inside-the-aaron-swartz-investigation/
273654/ [https://perma.cc/9G7M-URF9] (stating what Norton had said in front of the grand jury as
part of a subpoena) .
270. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
271. Id. at 1005 (1991).
272. 463 U.S. 277, 299 (1983).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1027 (White, J., dissenting).
276. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Introduction to the Economic Espionage Act, in CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL, http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1122-introductioneconomic-espionage-act [https://perma.cc/BR2X-94AZ].
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as opposed to misappropriating the same information by hand, a court
could then apply the CFAA simply because the employee used a
computer.
Distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) provide another
example. 277 In The Coming Swarm, Molly Sauter draws out the analogy
between a DDoS and the brick-and-mortar forms of sit-in protests. 278
Both involve occupying the target’s open-to-the-public property and
occupying that property. Similarly, DDoS and sit-in protests disrupt the
target’s business and display civil disobedience to potential patrons and
the community. 279 The punishments associated with brick-and-mortar
sit-ins were generally for trespassing and included imprisonment from a
few hours to a few months. 280 However, under the CFAA, the
occupation of server capacity results in significantly larger penalties in
comparison. 281
Comparisons to other statutes indicate that the CFAA sentences are
likely more severe than the seriousness of the offenses. Protecting
against and deterring DDoS attacks and other online activities is
important for national security, and prosecutors should have tools to
deter and punish computer crimes. However, without a narrow or
nuanced application of the CFAA, the government may hand out harsh,
unintended punishments, such as punishing First Amendment expression
in addition to cyberattacks. Therefore, current CFAA sentences may
violate proportionality principles.
Some may argue that individuals can cause more damage with
computers, therefore courts should punish people more severely for
computer crimes. However, aside from a minimum damages threshold
needed for a civil claim, damages are not a factor in trial after the initial
threshold to bring a civil claim is met. 282 Instead, the amount of damage
is a factor to be considered at sentencing. The medium used to inflict the
same harm should not drastically alter the outcome. The theft of $100
from a bitcoin account should not differ dramatically from $100 stolen
from a wallet. The potential for harm through the use of a computer

277. MOLLY SAUTER, THE COMING SWARM 15 (2014).
278. Id. at 15–17.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. For example, in Massachusetts criminal trespass is “punished by a fine of not more than one
hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days or both such fine and
imprisonment.” MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 266, § 120 (2016).
282. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2004).
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should not amplify the individual’s culpability. This amplification is
typical to devices like firearms, which is a very different consumer good
from computers. Unlike firearms, computers have many functions that
are not inherently dangerous. Further, the notion that computers have the
potential for greater harm speaks mainly to economic harms; noneconomic conduct, such as cyberstalking, may cause less harm than their
in-person counterparts. 283
III. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE CFAA TO REQUIRE
OWNERS TO AFFIRMATIVELY REVOKE AUTHORIZATION
Most outrage over the CFAA occurs when prosecutors bring criminal
charges for violations of private contracts. 284 Courts need clarity on the
insider access issue. Clarity would also soothe concerns from the
“[n]umerous and recent instances of heavy-handed prosecutions for nonmalicious computer crimes [that] have raised serious questions as to how
the law treats violations of terms of service, employer agreement or
website notices.” 285 Therefore, Congress should amend the CFAA to
require owners to notify defendants of revoked access. Operators should
revoke access they deem is a material breach of their terms. Granted, in
many cases an operator will not know if a breach occurred; 286 however,
the difficulty of a private party monitoring their contractual relationships
does not justify the Government enforcing compliance on their behalf,
sometimes without their consent. 287
The owner could revoke authorized access by disabling the user’s
access where possible, or filing a police report. 288 This will prevent
prosecutors from adding CFAA charges in order to intimidate
defendants going into negotiations. Similarly, it would create another bar
for punishment of morally reprehensible, yet legal, online conduct.
Furthermore, this is similar to the current approach with copyright take-

283. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Trespass, Not Fraud: The Need for New Sentencing Guidelines
in CFAA Cases, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 6 (2016).
284. See supra section II.C.
285. Aaron’s Law Press Release, supra note 230.
286. For example, in instances involving the use of fake names, posting of copyrighted material,
or inappropriate communications.
287. JSTOR Evidence in United States vs. Aaron Swartz, JSTOR (July 30, 2013),
http://docs.jstor.org/summary.html [https://perma.cc/W4H3-NAW5] (JSTOR would not have
brought charges against Aaron Swartz: “although we recognized that any charging decision was
entirely up to the government, from our perspective, we preferred that no charges be brought”).
288. Although a police report may not necessarily provide notice to a user, it could be an
alternative threshold for search warrants.
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down notices, another area of law also adapting to the introduction of the
internet. 289 This approach may permit terms of service violations until
owners detect the prohibited conduct; however, the access granters
should bear the burden of policing their contracts and appropriately limit
and monitor access at their own risk. Relying on contractual
commitments may not be sufficient means of protecting organizational
interest. If organizations do not feel confident that contract breach
remedies or other existing laws 290 can make them whole, then they
should employ additional security mechanisms. The Federal Trade
Commission considers access limitation and network monitoring
important security principles for organizations that control or store
information. 291 Organizations should only provide the minimal amount
of access needed by each user.292 Network monitoring should flag or
lock out any unusual or suspect activities. 293
Tort law also provides analogies. While trespass varies from state to
state, many consider a trespass an unauthorized entry or unlawfully
remaining in a place. 294 Unlawfully remaining can occur when a person
overstays their permission to enter, when a person enters with criminal
intent thereby impliedly revoking an owner’s consent to enter, 295 or
when an owner revokes access or otherwise exercises their right to
exclude. 296 First, exceeding a temporary license is rarely at issue in

289. Under section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), the notice and
takedown procedure is one requirement for internet service providers’ exemption from liability and
centers around the concept requiring knowledge of prohibited conduct before liability will attach.
290. Such as trade secret misappropriation, extortion, or fraud.
291. FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/start-security-guide-business
[https://perma.cc/AB2T-DFDX].
292. For example, a summer intern should not have access to sensitive human resource files.
293. For example, an organization can require additional verification when a user logs in from an
unknown computer or different location.
294. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-7-2, 13A-7-3, 13A-7-4 (West 2016); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 11.46.320, 11.46.330 (West 2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1502, 13-1503, 13-1504 (West
2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-203 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-4-502, 18-4-503, 18-4504 (West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 822, 823 (West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-813,
708-814, 708-815 (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 511.060, 511.070, 511.080 (West 2016);
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 569.140, 569.150 (West 2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-203 (West 2015);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.10, 140.15, 140.17 (West 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.245 (West 2016);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.52.070, 9A.52.080 (West
2016).
295. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 110 Wash. 2d 253, 258, 751 P.2d 837, 839–40 (1988)
(recognizing that a person’s license to enter is impliedly revoked if the person enters with criminal
intent, leaving the person exposed to penalties for unauthorized entry).
296. Id.
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CFAA cases, as websites generally do not express expiration dates in
terms of service but rather reserve the right to suspend or terminate
access at their discretion. 297 Second, a breach of contract is not criminal,
but civil. 298 So even if a person obtained access to a dating website
intending to lie about their height in violation of the terms of service’s
prohibition on false or misleading information, it would not trigger an
implied revocation of the dating site’s grant of access. 299 Unlawfully
remaining in a place after an owner has revoked permission, however, is
an approach that can help distinguish CFAA cases of authorization.
When an owner grants access to a user on an ongoing basis without
explicit terms of what conduct would terminate that access (not merely
prohibited conduct), the owner should exercise their right to exclude.
One legal encyclopedia states:
[T]he claim that the defendant’s entry or remaining was
unlawful will come down to the contention that . . . a person
with a legal interest in the property . . . had exercised a legal
right to forbid such entry or remaining . . . . Sometimes the
purported exercise of such a right will be found not to have
occurred, as where the communication relied upon as
manifesting such exercise is too general to be given that
interpretation or, in the context in which it occurred, cannot be
taken literally. 300
This approach is consistent with recent Ninth Circuit holdings.301 In
Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 302 the court distilled the general
rule that “a defendant can run afoul of the CFAA when he or she has no
permission to access a computer or when such permission has been
revoked explicitly.” 303 In Power Ventures, Facebook sent the defendant
a cease-and-desist letter and imposed an IP address block in an effort to

297. See, e.g., eBay User Agreement, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/useragreement.html [https://perma.cc/ZRG8-M4QW] (“If we believe you are abusing eBay in any way,
we may, in our sole discretion and without limiting other remedies, limit, suspend, or terminate your
user account(s) and access to our Services . . . .”).
298. See Hofmann & Reitman, supra note 6.
299. See Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352–54 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
no trespass occurred even when an owner explicitly refused permission for a specified purpose, and
the defendant knowingly and willfully violated the scope of the permission, because the defendant’s
violation of the contract did not violate the essential interests protected by the writ of trespass).
300. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 21.2 (2d ed. 2003).
301. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 828 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Nosal, 828 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2016).
302. 828 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2016).
303. Id. at 1077.
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prevent defendant’s access. 304 Returning to an earlier case, in Drew, 305
MySpace could have disabled the account, disabled communication
features, or sent a notice to the account or registered email. Any of these
mechanisms would have put Drew on notice that MySpace limited or
revoked some or all of her previous access.
In Drew, the court acknowledged the potential overbreadth of
allowing criminal charges for private contract breaches.
One need only look to the MSTOS terms of service to see the
expansive and elaborate scope of such provisions whose breach
engenders the potential for criminal prosecution. Obvious
examples of such breadth would include: . . . submit[ting]
intentionally inaccurate data about his or her age, height and/or
physical appearance, . . . [posting] candid photographs of
classmates without their permission, . . . entreating [neighbors]
to purchase his or her daughter’s girl scout cookies . . . . 306
However, while the court rejected the Government’s arguments, it did
not prohibit a breach of a private contract as predicate conduct for a
criminal charge under the CFAA. 307 Rather, the court stated that “the
question arises as to whether Congress has ‘establish[ed] minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement,’” 308 and held that CFAA does not
“set forth ‘clear guidelines’ or ‘objective criteria’ as to the prohibited
conduct in the Internet/website or similar contexts.” 309 The court looked
for any sort of limiting factor to prevent over-inclusiveness, such as
requiring website operators to file a police report or have suffered actual
loss or damage, but found nothing to distinguish innocuous online
conduct 310 from conduct intended to be covered by the CFAA. 311
Legal scholars advocating for reform of computer trespass torts often
reference concepts found in traditional physical trespass torts. 312 Orin
304. Id.
305. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
306. Id. at 466.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. The court acknowledged that not only bad actors violate terms of service agreements:
However, one need not consider hypotheticals to demonstrate the problem. In this case, Megan
(who was then thirteen years old) had her own profile on MySpace, which was in clear
violation of the MSTOS which requires that users be ‘14 years of age or older.’ No one would
seriously suggest that Megan’s conduct was criminal or should be subject to criminal
prosecution.
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 466.
311. Id. at 466–67.
312. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 283.
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Kerr states that “[m]ost CFAA offenses are rooted in trespass . . . not
economic crimes,” 313 and argues that the sentencing guidelines
governing CFAA punishments should create a new CFAA trespass
offense to differentiate unauthorized accesses that violate privacy but do
not result in economic harm. 314 While creating separate sentencing
guidelines for trespass without fraud will not address other concerns
highlighted in this Comment, it could address the proportionality issues
with the CFAA by better aligning sentencing severity with comparable
crimes.
Congress and the courts should look to Eighth Amendment principles
when interpreting the CFAA and its definitions. Congress should amend
the CFAA to provide clarity regarding its intent—unless the United
States Supreme Court resolves the circuit split first.
CONCLUSION
Those defending against terms of service violations may be at risk for
disproportionate punishments, contrary to Eighth Amendment principles,
until Congress or the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split over the
criminal reach of the CFAA. Currently, prosecutors could charge
millions of unsuspecting internet users under the CFAA. Congress
should reform the CFAA to require owners to affirmatively revoke
access, including implementing technical disablement where reasonable,
with clear notice to the user. Notice provides an additional safeguard for
the rights and liberties of the connected citizenry. Furthermore, requiring
an affirmative act would harmonize the CFAA with traditional notions
of trespass, and it would align the CFAA with Eighth Amendment
principles of proportionality.

313. Id. at 1.
314. Id. at 18.

